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ABSTRACT 
 Experts have been predicting the onset of cyber warfare for decades.  Yet, despite 
the relative ease and anonymity with which cyber-attacks can be conducted on military 
targets, the preponderance of historical cyber-related actions has been largely confined to 
the realms of espionage and crime.  So far, close integration of cyberspace operations 
with terrestrial military operations is a rare, if slightly growing, occurrence in warfare. 
 While discussions about cyber warfare have raged in academia and government in 
recent years, they have primarily focused on the impacts and implications that cyberspace 
operations have at the strategic level of war.  Comparatively little research has been done 
to analyze how cyberspace operations will impact the battlefield. 
 We propose a framework for military planners to envision ways that cyberspace 
operations can be used to affect the battlefield and integrate with terrestrial combat 
operations.  We then apply that framework to analyze a thought experiment involving a 
hypothetical conflict on the Korean peninsula in an attempt to catch a glimpse of what 
cyberspace operations may mean for the future of land warfare. 
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I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CYBERSPACE ON THE 
MODERN BATTLEFIELD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Experts have been predicting the onset of cyber warfare for decades. So far, digital 
espionage and crime have made up the preponderance of historical cyber-related actions, 
despite the purported ease and anonymity of executing cyber-attacks against military 
targets. Yet, close integration of cyberspace operations with terrestrial military operations 
is a rare, if slightly growing, occurrence in warfare.  
In 2008, Russia invaded the small neighboring country of Georgia. Russian-
coordinated cyber-attacks, in support of a conventional ground force invasion, degraded 
the government of Georgia’s ability to communicate through the Internet.1 From 2013 to 
2015, Russia also used cyber warfare in support of its annexation of Crimea and the 
continued destabilization of Eastern Ukraine.2 In 2016, the United States established Joint 
Task Force Areas to conduct cyberspace operations against the Islamic State in support of 
Operation Inherent Resolve.3 It seems the use of cyber in warfare is growing. 
In 1992, Arquilla and Ronfeldt were among the first to envision the changes that 
the Information Revolution would bring to warfare. They coined the term “cyberwar” and 
theorized about the potential effects of computers and networks on future virtual and 
physical battlespaces.4 Most importantly, they viewed cyberwar not simply as military 
operations in cyberspace but as an operational concept centered on control or governance 
                                                 
1 Max Gordon, “Lessons from the Front: A Case Study of Russian Cyber Warfare” (research report, 
Air Command and Staff College, December 2015), 11–12. 
2 Margarita Jaitner, “Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine,” in Cyber War in 
Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), 
90–91. 
3 Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, “U.S. Military Has Launched a New Digital War against the 
Islamic State,” Washington Post, July 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
us-militarys-digital-war-against-the-islamic-state-is-off-to-a-slow-start/2016/07/15/76a3fe82-3da3-11e6-
a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.195fdff0287a. 
4 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Cyberwar Is Coming! RP-223 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992): 
33. Later published in Comparative Strategy (April-June) 1993, Vol. 14 
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of information: translating information dominance into battlefield dominance.5 Since then, 
however, academic thought has focused more on the application of cyberspace operations 
as a tool of national power or as a form of strategic attack, principally on infrastructure.  
Evidence of this strategic focus is readily apparent. In 1996, Molander, Riddile, 
Wilson, and a team of experts conducted a study on strategic information warfare. The 
study used a nuclear proliferation exercise known as “The Day After,” which was built on 
a scenario of major regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, to explore cyber threats. The team 
defined “strategic information warfare” as damaging national information infrastructure 
through cyberspace and scoped their study accordingly.6 They acknowledged that cyber 
vulnerabilities to military operations existed in the theater of conflict, yet they did not 
examine it in their study. Their study concluded that the cyber threat to national information 
infrastructure was so grave that “key national military strategy assumptions are obsolescent 
and inadequate” when confronted with the harsh potential of cyberattacks.7  
Similarly, Rattray’s Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace both exemplified the 
fascination with the strategic potential of the cyber domain and codified its use in fulfilling 
such a role. Rattray’s concept was essentially a new form of strategic bombing. He justified 
this by postulating that information infrastructures would likely be centers of gravity for 
advanced nations like the United States. His analysis identified the shortfalls of strategic 
bombing and the four requirements for successful “strategic information operations.”8 
Despite his admissions about possible limitations to the effectiveness of strategic cyber 
warfare, Rattray’s ideas appear to have taken hold widely among senior political and 
military leaders around the world. The use of cyberspace operations for strategic warfare 
                                                 
5 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 6, 15, 23. 
6 Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New 
Face of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 1. 
7 Molander, Riddile, Wilson, xvii. 
8 Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 27, 77, 
99–101. 
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or political coercion is by far the norm, while the use of cyberspace operations to affect the 
battlefield remains the exception.9 
Despite this decades-long focus on the strategic potential of cyberspace to end wars 
and cripple nations, Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness have questioned the effectiveness of 
strategic cyber operations. Their study conducts an empirical evaluation of the success or 
failure of strategic cyber actions to coerce. They compiled a data set of 192 known cyber 
incidents and found only 5.7% achieved any coercive success.10 They acknowledge that 
the purpose of different aggressive acts in cyberspace varies and that “cyber degradation” 
is the only strategy in cyberspace likely to affect an adversary’s behavior. The rate of 
coercive success increases to over 30% when examining only instances of cyber 
degradation.11 Overall, their work identifies a trend similar to analyses of the efficacy of 
strategic bombing12; when used alone, strategic cyber actions have little coercive effect.13 
They conclude that strategic cyber actions have the greatest coercive effect when used in 
conjunction with other elements of national power.14 
                                                 
9 A brief history of open-source cyber events supports this point. Work by Stuxnet, Shamoon, and 
events in Estonia in 2007, and many other cases are examples of cyber being used as a form of strategic 
attack. The few well-known or acknowledged cases of cyber being used in support of military operations 
was Georgia in 2008 and JTF areas in the fight against ISIS. Jason Healey, “Learn Cyber Conflict History 
or Doom Yourself to Repeat It,” Armed Forces Journal, December 17, 2013; Andy Greenberg, “How An 
Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,” WIRED, accessed November 23, 2017, 
https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/; “Saudi Arabia Warns on Cyber Defense as 
Shamoon Resurfaces,” Reuters, January 23, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-cyber/saudi-
telecoms-authority-says-cyber-attacks-have-targeted-websites-idUSKBN1571ZR.; Nakashima and Ryan, 
“U.S. Military Has Launched a New Digital War against the Islamic State.” 
10 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Changing Character 
of Cyber Power and Coercion. (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 29. 
11 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 29. 
12 Pape argues that strategic bombing is one of the “least effective ways to use airpower” because 
punishing populations only works in long wars of attrition decided by materiel superiority. Robert Anthony 
Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1996). 316–317, 327. Clodfelter concludes that short of nuclear annihilation, air 
power has proved an unreliable means for achieving political goals. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air 
Power (New York: The Free Press, 1989). 
13 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy, 385. 
14 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 7–8. 
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The current U.S. organizational design maintains cyber capabilities primarily at the 
strategic level, reflecting the dominant view of cyber warfare as a strategic tool.15 
However, U.S. forces are ever more reliant upon digital technology and operate in an 
increasingly interconnected and networked environment. The essential role computers play 
in every aspect of modern militaries is undeniable. Computers have been a critical part of 
almost every major piece of military hardware since the late 1980s.16 Perhaps most 
critically, nearly all planning, coordinating, resourcing, and information gathering is done 
on networked computers. That means all plans, units, processes, and major weapon systems 
in modern militaries are theoretically accessible through cyberspace. U.S. forces risk losing 
their technological advantages on future battlefields if the cyber debate continues to focus 
primarily on the strategic level of war. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the implications of cyber for battle? Recent conflicts have provided few 
answers to this question. As of this writing, the brief Russo-Georgian War of 2008 is the 
only clear example of the close integration of offensive cyberspace operations with 
maneuver warfare.17 The conflict in Ukraine from 2014 to the present is potentially 
emerging as a second, but only time will tell if the techniques, tactics, and procedures 
employed warrant such a claim.18 Additionally, the cloak of secrecy surrounding 
cyberspace operations increases the difficulty in analyzing their effects on the battlefield. 
Due to this near-void of historical case studies available for analysis, addressing the gap 
requires taking a heuristic approach.  
                                                 
15 In the DoD Cyber Strategy for 2015, USCYBERCOM identifies its three missions as defending 
DoD networks, defending the nation, and supporting military operations and contingency plans. Despite the 
third mission sounding operationally focused, the document describes that mission as a presidential or 
SECDEF determination to use cyber operations as part of a military campaign. Ashton Carter, Department 
of Defense Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), 5–6. 
16 David Bellin and Gary Chapman, Computers in Battle: Will They Work?, (Harcourt Brace and Co, 
1987), 62. 
17 Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, “The Russo-Georgian War (2008): 
The Role of the Cyber Attacks in the Conflict,” May 24, 2012, 5–10, https://www.afcea.org/site/defense/
cyber-committee. 
18 Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar.” 
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Our research seeks to answer multiple questions about the cyber domain, its effects 
on the modern battlefield, and what those effects imply for land warfare. Our goal is to 
examine the impacts of cyberspace operations on military combat operations through a 
thought experiment designed to explore the opportunities and vulnerabilities cyberspace 
presents. To do that, however, we must first answer a few questions through a review of 
the available literature. What is cyber? What are its effects? How dependent are modern 
militaries on the cyber domain? 
The scope of this study is limited to examining the impacts of cyberspace operations 
on land forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. While cyberspace operations 
have been thoroughly examined at the strategic level of war, the battlefield impacts of 
cyberspace operations have received far less attention.  Focusing on the impacts to land 
warfare only is necessary to bound our research and enable us to explore a smaller set of 
impacts and implications more thoroughly than if we examined warfare in all of the 
physical domains.    
C. METHODOLOGY 
We will conduct a two-part thought experiment to investigate cyberspace 
operations on the battlefield. The thought experiment is set within a hypothetical conflict 
on the Korean peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or 
North Korea) and the allied forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States. Prior to 
launching into the scenario, we examine military computer networks through the example 
of the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN), by asking the following 
questions: What is the DODIN? How dependent are U.S. land forces on the DODIN? How 
vulnerable is the DODIN to attack? Through the thought experiment, we attempt to 
evaluate the impact of cyberspace operations on the modern battlefield in order to draw out 
the implications they bring to warfare.  
The first part of the thought experiment envisions undetected compromise of U.S. 
classified networks during a clandestine reconnaissance mission into North Korea. The 
second part considers both sides using cyberspace operations to support high-intensity 
conflict on the Korean peninsula. Within the scenario, each use of cyberspace operations 
6 
is examined both for its feasibility and for its impacts on the battlefield. We evaluate these 
actions through a combination of open-source research and logical analytic processes. 
While we do not presume to have settled the debate over the implications of cyberspace 
operations for land warfare, we hope to provide a useful framework for analysis and a 
contribution to the body of academic and military thought on what this new domain means 
for future battlefields. 
a. Way Ahead  
There remains a significant gap in considering the many implications of cyber for 
land warfare and what that means for commanders planning and executing military 
campaigns. By analyzing the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the cyber 
domain, in line with the cyberwar concept of information dominance, we aim to provide 
insights into how this new technology might change the conduct of warfare. Has the 
emergence of the cyber domain shifted the offense-defense balance? Does it challenge the 
validity of the principles of war? Are modern armies organized and composed to leverage 
this new domain on the battlefield?  
We present this thesis in three sections. In the first section, we introduce the study, 
elaborate upon our research question and methodology, explore the literature regarding the 
effects of the cyber domain, and present our analytical framework. In the second section, 
we conduct a two-part thought experiment, pursuing the line of questioning mentioned 
previously and exploring the impacts of cyberspace operations on land warfare. In the third 
section, we analyze our findings and draw conclusions regarding what the cyber domain 
implies for land warfare, in an attempt to provide a framework for designing better 







II. INVESTIGATING CYBER AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD  
A. WHAT IS CYBER?  
“Cyber” was originally just a prefix. Yet in today’s military and international 
relations dialogue, “cyber” has become both a prefix and a noun. But what do military 
officers and politicians mean when they say “cyber”? Uses and definitions vary. Words 
like “Cyberwar,” “cyber power,” “cyber weapons,” “cyber-attacks,” and “cyberspace” 
permeate academic literature, but what does a phrase like “We need to invest more in 
cyber” mean? From a military perspective, “cyber” is routinely defined as “cyberspace” or 
the “cyber domain.” The two terms are synonymous and refer to all computer networks 
including the Internet, networks’ resident data, and the machines connected to them.19 
Analyzing cyber at the domain level, rather than focusing on cyber weapons or cyber-
attacks, provides the most holistic view of its impacts on warfare. Simply looking at the 
tools used in cyberspace is akin to analyzing Army weapons to determine the implications 
of ground combat on warfare. 
Libicki considers cyber to be a subset of information warfare. He separated 
information warfare into seven forms, four of which could all be considered manifestations 
of cyber warfare today.20 The first, command and control warfare, was attacking the 
systems through which a military commands and controls its forces.21 The second, hacker 
warfare, he defined as attacking civilian systems through the Internet.22 The third, 
electronic warfare, he defined as an attempt to “degrade the physical basis for transferring 
information.”23 The fourth, cyber warfare, he considered at the time, to be in the realm of 
fantasy and included such things as virtual terrorism, semantic attacks, and simulation 
                                                 
19 Joint Staff Director of Operations, “Joint Publication 3–12 (R) Cyberspace Operations” (Joint Staff, 
February 5, 2013), v. 
20 Martin Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (National Defense University, 1995), 7. 
21 Libicki, 9. 
22 Libicki, 49–50. 
23 Libicki, 27. 
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warfare.24 While very precise when analyzing the different ways to conduct information 
warfare, Libicki’s definition of cyberwarfare has less to say about the presence of 
cyberspace on the battlefield and instead considers cyberspace to be the battlefield. 
Kello analyzed cyber by focusing on weapons in cyberspace, primarily malicious 
code that affects the data or behavior of machines.25 However, he did so at the strategic 
level, arguing that it has been incorrectly integrated into existing doctrines of international 
relations and war.26 Kello also assessed that cyber was “an imperfect tool of interstate 
coercion” that had not yet transformed warfare or affected the balance of power between 
states.27 Specifically, in the context of warfare he claimed that there has never been, and 
perhaps will never be, a true act of cyberwar, as cyber cannot replace military power but 
only augment its use.28  
This last assertion, however, displays a fundamental and widespread 
misunderstanding of the role of cyber in military operations. Kello is analyzing the strategic 
level of war and cyber as an instrument of national power, in the vein of Joseph Nye who 
coined the term “cyber power,”29 associating cyberwar with Libicki’s definition as 
simulation warfare. When he claims that cyber has not transformed warfare, he is not 
speaking of how armies fight on the battlefield but instead how warfare is an instrument of 
statecraft. Yet, cyber might well be in the process of transforming the way armies deploy, 
array, and employ their forces in combat on the battlefield, thus transforming warfare.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt coined the term “cyberwar” and defined it as a battlefield 
concept focused on governing or controlling information.30 In their study, Cyberwar is 
                                                 
24 Libicki, 75. 
25 Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2017), 1. 
26 Kello, 3. 
27 Kello, 119–21. 
28 Kello, 121. 
29 Nye defines cyber power as, “resources that relate to the creation, control, and communication of 
electronic and computer-based information,” which can be used to create effects both inside and outside of 
cyberspace. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011), 123. 
30 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Cyberwar Is Coming!, 4. 
9 
Coming!, they theorized about the implications of the Information Revolution for warfare. 
One of their key observations was the notion that cyberwar was not just hackers fighting 
in cyberspace but included the idea that control of information would give military forces 
a decisive battlefield advantage.31 In the 26 years since their study, the discussion about 
cyberspace and warfare has been conducted primarily in the strategic context, and thought 
about the impacts of cyberspace on warfare has been largely sidelined.  
While U.S. doctrine recommends the integration of cyber operations into joint force 
operations, it notes significant challenges to doing so, such as the centralization of cyber 
operations planning, the need for the joint force to synchronize fires and operations, de-
confliction between many actors, and legal considerations.32 However, the U.S. Army is 
developing an operational concept called multi-domain battle that emphasizes the 
integration of all warfighting domains with less regard for time and space.33 This concept 
claims new technologies and the trans-regional nature of current and future conflicts have 
expanded the battlespace, potentially unbounded by geography and with much-compressed 
timeframes. Multi-domain battle seeks to converge capabilities across all domains to create 
windows of opportunity to “defeat enemy systems and achieve friendly objectives 
outright.”34 
This new operational concept considers space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and 
information critical components of enemy and friendly operations that potentially threaten 
all forces regardless of geographic disposition. Specifically, regarding cyber effects on the 
battlefield, multi-domain battle predicts that U.S. adversaries will use cyber from the deep 
fires area to target U.S. networks and space-based systems, disrupting operations and U.S. 
forces’ ability to conduct decentralized mission command.35 However, for the enemy to 
                                                 
31 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 6, 15, 23. 
32 Joint Staff Director of Operations, “Joint Publication 3–12 (R) Cyberspace Operations,” vi. 
33 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms 
for the 21st Century” (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2017), 6–
7. 
34 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 4. 
35 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 18. 
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conduct these types of operations successfully requires significant preparation and 
mapping of U.S. systems and networks.36 
While it appears that the U.S. Army recognizes the significant potential to either 
enhance or disrupt military operations that cyberspace has brought to the battlefield, 
tactical units currently lack the organic capabilities to leverage the effects of this new 
domain. 
B. WHAT ARE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS OF “CYBER”? 
The Information Revolution of the late 20th century was ushered in by the rise of 
the digital computer. As computers increased in power and decreased in size, they were 
integrated into every piece of military hardware imaginable.37 Computerized weapons and 
systems brought incredible technological capabilities to military forces including long-
range precision fires, global communications, large sensor webs, and data processing and 
analytics.38 With the invention of packet switching, computer systems were networked 
together and cyberspace, or the cyber domain, was born.39 Thus, an important effect of 
cyberspace on the modern battlefield is that it connects high-technology weapons and 
information systems, enhancing their capabilities while also increasing their vulnerability 
to attacks through this new domain. 
Rona was one of the first to recognize this increasing vulnerability of high-
technology weapon systems in 1976. His characterization of the nature of advanced 
weapons, in that they consisted of physically separate but integrated subsystems with 
greatly increased external information flows, has risen in importance with the growth of 
                                                 
36 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 26. 
37 As early as the mid-1980s, computers were considered the most important component in every 
major weapons system in development at the time. David Bellin and Gary Chapman, Computers in Battle: 
Will They Work? First Edition (Harcourt Brace and Co, 1987), 62. 
38 Bellin and Chapman, 66–68, 70, 81–90. 
39 The invention of packet switching is widely considered the foundational technology that led to the 
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cyberspace.40 He claimed that the performance of advanced weapons systems depended 
upon the integrity and availability of their external information flows, making them 
vulnerable to countermeasures targeted at those flows.41 Rona specifically noted that 
denial, disruption, or manipulation of external information flows might become the primary 
method by which a belligerent seeks to protect its forces against advanced weapons systems 
such a precision munitions or cruise missiles.42  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s ideas about cyberwar align with Rona’s insights about the 
growing importance of information flows. As they refined their ideas over the years, 
Arquilla maintained that a critical implication of cyberwar was the importance of achieving 
and maintaining the information edge.43 In his opinion, having the information edge 
provided a decisive advantage on the battlefield because Information Revolution 
technologies empowered advanced militaries by providing enhanced situational awareness, 
precise overwhelming firepower, and unparalleled connectivity to the warfighter at the 
tactical level.44 However, dependence on those same technologies makes advanced 
militaries vulnerable to disruption.45 This disruption can be achieved through physical 
attacks on sensors or systems, jamming of signals, or through cyberspace. Thus, having the 
information edge means not just knowing more than one’s enemy but also being able to 
employ high-technology systems while denying or disrupting those of the opponent. 
Libicki argued that the networking of military weapons and information systems 
created a new center of gravity for advanced militaries, yet he focused on influencing the 
decision-making of the opponent rather than the integration of cyber and maneuver 
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warfare.46 He viewed cyber weapons generally as inaccurate and not dependable, claiming 
integrating them with military operations would be problematic.47 He asserts, “If one 
cannot predict the effects of information warfare on the adversary, one cannot begin to 
trade it off for or synchronize it with other forms of warfare.”48  
Berkowitz claimed that future wars would be fought on combined cyber and 
physical battlefields and that victory would first require winning the war over 
information.49 Some of the critical aspects of this new face of warfare included the 
vulnerability of massed armies, network organizational structures, and “information 
armor” consisting of dispersion, covertness, and stealth.50 He noted the four most 
important ideas that affect modern war are asymmetry, information war, cyberwar, and the 
observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop.51 
Gartzke points out that cyber-attacks will prove potent only when they are used in 
conjunction with or followed up by military force.52 His overall argument is that strategic 
cyberwar is unlikely to be significant in world affairs because the Internet cannot replace 
physical force in a conflict.53 Additionally, because the effects of a cyber-attack are 
temporary the value of cyber in battle is in creating short windows of surprise effects that 
can only be harnessed when used in conjunction with terrestrial military operations.54 As 
a result, he suggests that cyberspace will not empower smaller and weaker groups but will 
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instead increase the advantages of strong military powers that can exploit windows of 
opportunity with significant military force.55 
Gartzke, like Kello, tends to equate the term “cyberwar” with the idea of a conflict 
between nations to occur in cyberspace without the need for armies in the field. Their 
conclusions are affirmations of the original cyberwar concept rather than refutations of it. 
Cyberwar calls for the integration of cyber capabilities with battlefield maneuver, not the 
replacement of one with the other.56 All these experts mentioned in this section seem to 
agree that cyberspace operations will only be valuable in battle when integrated with 
military operations in the physical domains.  
C. BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In an attempt to visualize the impacts of cyberspace on the battlefield, we designed 
a conceptual framework illustrating how it interacts with the other physical domains.  
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Figure 1. Cyber Domain Interaction Framework 
The cyber domain is physically separated from the other domains. Sea touches land, 
both of which touch the air, and ascend high enough air becomes space. Land, sea, air, and 
space forces can all potentially attack each other directly with physical weapons. This is 
not entirely true of cyberspace. The only way the other domains physically “touch” 
cyberspace is through the infrastructure that creates and sustains it, and the machines that 
connect to it. Thus, while an air raid could bomb a physical server in an attempt to destroy 
a cyber weapon, if that weapon was stored in the cloud or backed up in a different physical 
location, then the air raid will have failed.  
Conversely, however, a physical machine could be directly targeted and even 
destroyed by a cyberattack. For example, a drone could be hacked and forced to land in the 
wrong location, falling into the hands of the enemy.57 This is not a hypothetical example, 
but one that has already occurred. In 2011, a U.S. drone was hacked and forced to land in 
Iran, resulting in the capture of an advanced U.S. system. 
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In addition to illustrating the physical separation of the cyber domain from the 
traditional domains, the framework also highlights five major effects the cyber domain 
manifests on the battlefield. It creates these effects by connecting and facilitating computer-
based technological capabilities such as networked sensor systems, global communication 
networks, and data processing and analytics. It also notes that cyberspace operations are a 
means by which commanders attack, defend, or facilitate the three technological 
capabilities, thereby tampering with their resulting effects. This seems like a simple 
conclusion, but it is an important deduction. U.S. Joint Publication 3-12R classifies three 
types of cyberspace operations: offensive, defensive, and DODIN.58 DODIN operations, 
which include routine use of networks, are what manifest, facilitate, or sustain the effects 
previously noted. Defensive operations protect the DODIN and offensive operations attack 
the enemy’s ability to manifest the same battlefield effects. If cyberspace enables long-
range precision fires, then cyberspace can be the conduit to disrupt, degrade, deny, or 
destroy the enemy’s capability to conduct them. If cyberspace enhances decision-making 
through expansive sensor webs, big data analytics, and artificial intelligence, then that 
decision-making can be slowed down, corrupted, deceived, or disrupted through offensive 
cyberspace operations.  
D. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definitions of and ideas about what cyber is abound. In an attempt at precision, we 
use the following definitions and terms. In accordance with Joint Publication 3-12R, 
cyberspace and the cyber domain are synonymous and refer to all computer networks, the 
data on those networks, and embedded processors and controllers.59 Cyberspace operations 
are military actions conducted in cyberspace.60 As defined by Kello, Cyber weapons are 
malicious code that manipulates data and/or machines.61 As conceived by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, cyberwar is an operational concept that views cyberspace operations integrated 
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with physical military operations to achieve a decisive advantage in battle.62 We avoid 
using the terms “cyber warfare” and “information warfare” as “cyber warfare” generally 
refers to cyberspace operations to achieve strategic objectives as opposed to cyberspace 
operations on the battlefield, and “information warfare” is a larger concept that focuses on 
disrupting the decision-making of the enemy. We try to minimize any additional use of the 
word “cyber” outside of these definitions as much as possible, but recognize that its use is 
sometimes necessary to specify an action occurring in cyberspace as opposed to the other 
domains. 
Our review of the literature indicates the cyber domain manifests five major 
battlefield effects by connecting and facilitating technological capabilities. These 
capabilities broadly fall under the following categories: sensor networks, global 
communication networks, data processing, and artificial intelligence. The five major 
effects these capabilities manifest on the battlefield include empowered small units, long-
range precision fires, enhanced situational awareness, fast global communications, and 
improved decision-making. Finally, cyberspace operations will be most effective on the 
modern battlefield when integrated with physical military operations. 
To harness the effects of cyberspace in battle, warfighting doctrine requires 
reassessment. This reassessment should include the principles of war; traditional thought 
on objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity; impacts to time, space, and force 
considerations; and the offense/defense balance. While a complete reassessment of 
operational doctrine in light of the effects of cyberspace is outside the scope of this thesis, 
we use the results of our thought experiment to identify which traditional concepts may be 
challenged by the rise of the cyber domain.  
Critically, none of the effects noted in our framework result from the use of cyber 
weapons; they are simply reflections of the broader impacts the cyber domain has on the 
battlefield. In our opinion, a joint force will better employ cyberspace operations in battle 
if it views them in terms of how they can manipulate the battlefield effects of the cyber 
domain. 
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III. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT—PART I 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Extensive use of computers and networks characterizes modern militaries, 
especially the U.S. Armed Forces. The Information Revolution and the corresponding 
Revolution in Military Affairs that captured the U.S. military’s attention in the 1980s and 
1990s showed how computer networks could transform armed forces. As a result, 
cyberspace now connects many critical functions and capabilities of the U.S. military as 
well as other modern militaries with similar technologically advanced weaponry. This 
chapter seeks to evaluate the impacts of cyberspace operations on land warfare when 
integrated with terrestrial military forces. Understanding such potential impacts requires 
taking a closer look at how dependent modern militaries are on cyberspace. As a 
representative example, we analyze the largest military communications network in the 
world: the United States Department of Defense Information Network, or DODIN.  
B. WHAT IS THE DODIN? 
The DODIN is “all networks and information systems owned or leased by DOD.”63 
It can be thought of as the U.S. military’s territory in cyberspace, though portions of it also 
connect to the Internet. The DODIN’s physical network consists of computers, servers, 
cables, and satellites; supporting voice, data, and video and messaging services around the 
globe.64  
The DODIN is unique when compared to historical communication networks due 
to the breadth of military functions reliant on it. It is similar to early communication 
technologies, such as the telegraph, in that it enables swift communication across vast 
distances. Parallels even exist between telegraph and DODIN network protocols. The 
exchange between two computers using the eight-digit binary byte mirrors the eight-panel 
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shutter telegraph from the mid-1800s.65 While the telegraph rapidly spread across the 
world, it also had significant strategic impact on the conduct of the American Civil War.66 
However, the prohibitive transaction costs and inability to reach multiple end-users 
simultaneously prevented the level of dependence on the telegraph system that we see on 
the DODIN today.  
Information flows across the DODIN via the electromagnetic spectrum to create, 
exchange, and store information across multiple domains—to numerous users—in near 
real-time.67 The purpose of DODIN operations is to assure system and network 
availability, authenticity, information protection, and information delivery, all acting to 
protect and maintain freedom of action for the DOD across cyberspace.68 Never before 
could information flow simultaneously in all directions between air, naval, and space-based 
platforms to soldiers operating on the frontiers of distant lands.69 
1. How Dependent Are U.S. Land Forces on the DODIN? 
The ability to share information across countless nodes in real time theoretically 
provides unmatched situational awareness and improves decision-making. However, the 
DODIN does not just facilitate communication. The Army describes the DODIN as a 
“critical warfighting platform” supporting all operations by enabling command and control 
of dispersed forces as well as by guiding precise fires, disseminating intelligence, and 
providing logistics support for those forces.70 Additionally, Army computers, networks, 
and cloud services are the repository of vast stockpiles of data and are the default means 
by which to build and communicate briefings and plans. As our cyber domain interaction 
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framework illustrates, while nearly all communications in the Army rely upon the DODIN 
in some way, the Army’s high technology capabilities are also inextricably tied to it as 
well.  
How does this dependency manifest on the battlefield? As demonstrated as early as 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a critical strength of the modern U.S. military has been 
its ability to synchronize parallel operations across the battlespace.71 This high level of 
synchronization is a central tenet of the idea of Network-Centric Warfare. Network-Centric 
Warfare is an “information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater 
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”72 It calls for an 
architecture that consists of three grids: an information grid, a sensor grid, and a transaction 
grid.73 The DODIN serves as the information grid in this concept, enabling numerous 
battlefield functions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, long-range 
precision fires, synchronized battlefield maneuver, and systematic logistical support. As a 
result, the DODIN also represents a key vulnerability to exploit by enemies employing 
cyberwar concepts. 
2. How Vulnerable Is the DODIN to Attack? 
The DODIN’s most significant vulnerabilities are due to the fact that it is an 
amalgamation of thousands of networks that were created separately and later bundled 
together in an attempt to improve security. As late as 2016, it was described as a “quasi-
feudal patchwork of often incompatible local networks.”74 However, in just the past few 
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years, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its subordinate command Joint Forces 
Headquarters-DODIN have attempted to address these issues through multiple initiatives 
such as the Joint Information Environment, Operation Gladiator Shield, and the creation of 
joint regional security stacks.75 Despite these efforts, the DODIN is still subject to daily 
attacks that take on many forms and range in severity and duration. Attackers range from 
lone-wolf hackers to organized criminals and adversary nations. Some examples that 
highlight these vulnerabilities include the Agent.btz virus, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) breach, Moonlight Maze, and satellite hacking.  
In 2008, the U.S. military banned thumb drives in reaction to the Agent.btz virus.76 
It infected U.S. CENTCOM computers as well as hundreds of thousands of others around 
the world. The worm was designed to propagate widely and then send information about 
the infected systems to the controllers.77 Agent.btz demonstrated the feasibility and 
relative ease with which an adversary using a cyberspace operation could gain access to 
highly sensitive areas of the DODIN, potentially compromising operational information. If 
the United States had been at war with Russia rather than at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the battlefield consequences of such a breach could have been grave. 
The 2015 OPM breaches demonstrated the sheer volume of information that can be 
acquired via a compromise of U.S. government networks and the incredibly sensitive 
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nature of the information available on networks like the DODIN. Together, two breaches 
compromised the personal data—to include social security numbers and fingerprints—of 
over 25 million government employees and their families.78 Imagine if this information 
were released online. Identity theft would be the most common, but probably least 
significant, result for the victims of this attack. What might a global terrorist group do with 
such information? They could post kill lists on social media, not just of Soldiers but also 
of their wives, husbands, children, parents, or siblings. Perhaps they would even filter and 
sort their kill lists by U.S. units deployed to combat, complete with addresses and phone 
numbers of family members on the list. The battlefield effects of such an act would be hard 
to imagine. Would the posting of such a list affect the ability of deployed Soldiers to focus 
on their mission? Would cases of desertion increase? This massive theft of sensitive 
personnel information for such a large percentage of the federal workforce highlights the 
vulnerability of information at rest and serves as an indicator of the potential impacts of a 
breach of the of the DODIN. 
One of the earliest cyber-espionage campaigns conducted against the United States 
occurred between 1996 and 1999.79 Moonlight Maze refers to the investigations of a series 
of cyberattacks, initially detected in June 1998, purportedly aimed at stealing sensitive 
military technology information.80 While Moonlight Maze was a series of intrusions, when 
viewed together with the OPM breach, these incidents highlight the significant length of 
time during which an adversary can gather information within a system before being 
detected.  
Satellites are vital components of the DODIN that enable it to provide global 
communications support. Considering the DODIN is a critical capability for the DOD, the 
satellite infrastructure that gives it global reach might also be its critical vulnerability. 
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Satellites face many threats to deny, degrade, or disrupt the services they provide, and may 
even be targeted for destruction.81 Destructive attacks, especially by physical or 
cyberspace operations, however, are less likely than disruptive attacks simply because of 
the response they would provoke. The current policy of the United States declares 
dominance in space a necessity and that any attacks on our critical space architecture will 
provoke a severe response.82 Nevertheless, strategic competitors and potential adversaries 
are developing anti-satellite weapons, and satellite hacking, jamming, and spoofing are 
rising in frequency and prominence.83  
While destructive attacks on U.S. space systems would likely result in immediate 
retaliatory strikes against the aggressor’s satellites, temporary jamming or disruption might 
not be answered with a destructive, or even immediate, response unless such attacks cause 
significant battlefield effects or loss of life.84 A unit in combat dependent on satellite 
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communications for fire support, medical evacuation, operational synchronization, or 
extraction would have limited options for quickly overcoming satellite denial, degradation, 
or destruction. High-frequency radio communication and line-of-sight radio relays require 
planning and preparation, and even when planned for, may require critical moments to 
establish communications. Even for a military accustomed to planning for redundant 
communications, satellite communications represent a significant vulnerability. The 
battlefield effects of disruption could include precious moments of complete isolation for 
dispersed units, failure of satellite reliant devices, and inaccuracy of precision fires.  
How would U.S. forces respond to such battlefield disruption? Jamming of satellite 
signals is an expected condition of future battlefields for the U.S. military. Thus, the 
military response to battlefield jamming would likely be no different from the military 
response to any other standard battlefield action: employ new tactics or technology to 
counter the jamming.85 The unknown is how the U.S. military, or the government as a 
whole, would respond to a cyberspace operation against U.S. satellites that achieves the 
same disruptive battlefield effects. While also somewhat expected on future battlefields, 
due to the ever-increasing paranoia of catastrophic cyberspace operations crippling critical 
national infrastructure, such an attack might trigger a significantly greater military or 
government response. A more significant response might also be expected due to the nature 
of a cyberspace operation compared to the nature of localized jamming of signals. While 
the battlefield effect may be the same, localized jamming does not require compromise of 
the critical, and expensive, space asset. A cyberspace operation likely would.  
C. HOW DO BATTLEFIELD CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS IMPACT LAND 
FORCES? A KOREAN SCENARIO PART 1 
Our thought experiment analyzes the battlefield impact of cyberspace operations 
through the lens of our Cyber Domain Interaction Framework. We conduct our analysis in 
the context of a hypothetical conflict on the Korean peninsula:  
Diplomacy with North Korea has ground to a halt. Harsh statements from 
the regime in Pyongyang force the United States to cancel planned 
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negotiations over denuclearization. Soon, multiple intelligence sources 
confirm that the DPRK is planning to deceive the United States. Even as 
North Korea dismantled the Punggye-ri test site, they began constructing 
new secret nuclear facilities. The U.S. president orders the DOD to present 
a military option for neutralizing North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile 
capabilities. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff present a plan for a massive, synchronized 
operation to be executed in conjunction with the annual military exercises 
the U.S. conducts with South Korea. The plan is bold and risky. Successful 
execution hinges on the certain knowledge of locations of nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles within North Korea. The secretary of defense 
(SECDEF) orders U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to 
conduct clandestine special reconnaissance missions into North Korea to 
confirm these locations. USSOCOM and Special Operations Command-
Korea establish a combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) in 
a secret location near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to execute the 
reconnaissance mission, primarily through South Korean special operations 
forces (SOF), intelligence assets, and former defectors handled by the South 
Korean National Intelligence Service. The CJSOTF is given six months to 
confirm the locations of nuclear weapons, facilities, and ballistic missiles to 
allow for final planning and rehearsals for the pre-emptive strike. 
In this scenario, the CJSOTF has a unique role, providing critical information to 
enable the planning of a follow-on campaign that the commander of the United Nations, 
Combined Forces, and U.S. Forces Korea may not be able to obtain through other means. 
The DODIN provides the communications link between the task force, its reconnaissance 
teams, and higher headquarters through computer networks and satellite communications 
connections. Those data links facilitate mission planning, coordination, and execution; 
request and direct precision fire support to the task force; feed sensor inputs to operations 
centers and tactical units; and allow for data processing and analytics to be conducted 
across the DOD. 
Soon after the establishment of the CJSOTF in South Korea, Chinese and 
North Korean intelligence assets in the country take notice. Within a month, 
they have infiltrated a contracting company that provides services on the 
base. Their assets gain physical access to a laptop that is connected to the 
classified system and installs malware. When any user logs into the laptop, 
the malware manipulates memory to send electromagnetic signals on 
cellular frequencies to a dedicated receiver hidden outside the building. The 
attacker, a well-known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) group, 
uses the link to gather critical operational information. They steal operations 
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orders, concept briefs, personnel lists, logistics and communications plans 
and status, and much more. Within a couple of weeks, the Chinese APT has 
a thorough understanding of the CJSOTF’s plan and scheme of maneuver 
for the reconnaissance operations. They pass the information to the North 
Koreans. 
While a successful cyberspace operation like the one described in our scenario 
against classified U.S. military systems and networks may seem unlikely, due to the 
technical difficulty and coordination with national intelligence assets, it is not outside the 
realm of possibility. If such an attack were successful, would it be detected by U.S. forces? 
U.S. forces would likely detect the breach eventually, but detection of a cyberspace 
operation is difficult if the attack does not openly disrupt the operation of the system. As 
we have seen from our previous examples, detection typically has taken a long time. The 
OPM hack was stealing data for almost a year before being fully uncovered.86 The 
Moonlight Maze hacks are believed to have remained undetected for about two years.87 If 
we assume the U.S. military is twice as good at detecting attacks as the average civilian 
company, then we still have a planning factor of 103 days that the attacker could be in the 
system undetected.88 That is more than three months of compromised operational 
information. 
The difficulty in identifying malicious activity within a network has led to 
supplementing human defenders with advanced computer assets to support them. For 
example, the National Security Agency provided the Defense Information Security Agency 
with a platform called Sharkseer, which leverages artificial intelligence to monitor, and 
actively protect, the DODIN from advanced threats a human might not detect.89 Would an 
advanced tool such as this be capable of protecting the networks of operational or tactical 
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level military units, such as our notional CJSOTF? As illustrated by USCYBERCOM and 
JFHQ-DODIN’s efforts to map and reorganize DOD’s digital landscape, protecting the 
networks and systems of operational and tactical units is not only possible, but 
imperative.90 By seeking to centralize and standardize the DODIN, software tools should 
be able to be used anywhere on the network. Network monitoring tools would monitor data 
in motion at critical points, such as the Internet access points and the JRSSs, while host-
monitoring tools would monitor the behavior of the devices themselves.  
Suppose attackers are successful at defeating these defensive tools. How would 
such compromise affect the task force’s operations? With an estimated three months of 
undetected access to the CJSOTF’s classified network, the DPRK forces would have active 
knowledge of unit composition and disposition; dates, times and locations of upcoming 
operations; logistics status, systems and processes; and potentially much more critical 
information. The battlefield potential of such knowledge in the hands of any enemy could 
be catastrophic. In our scenario, the reconnaissance missions would be compromised. They 
could be ambushed and destroyed, or reconnaissance targets could be staged, resulting in 
future operations targeting false or ambush-laden objectives. We believe it is a valid 
assumption within this scenario that such compromise of operational networks would 
likely result in mission failure for the CJSOTF. DPRK forces would eliminate South 
Korean intelligence assets. DPRK forces would also ambush and destroy or capture the 
U.S. and South Korean SOF Recon teams. North Korea would move as many of their 
nuclear facilities and ballistic missiles as possible after discovering the mission of the 
CJSOTF.  
Attempts to discover the enemy’s operational plans during wartime are as old as 
war itself. Knowing what the enemy will do while keeping them ignorant of friendly plans 
typically results in victory for the army with the information advantage. In this case, the 
compromise of an operational military network like the DODIN via cyberspace operations 
has historical parallels in codebreaking during World War II or the North Vietnamese 
double-cross of Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group 
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(MACV-SOG) secret agents. The Battle of Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic 
demonstrate the consequences such a cyberattack might have on combat, in that the 
clandestine interception of enemy operational information directly resulted in battlefield 
catastrophe for the unwitting opponent. The North Vietnamese double-cross of Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and MACV-SOG secret agents is a direct historic parallel to 
our fictional Korean scenario. It demonstrates the effect a cyberspace operation could have 
on compromising human intelligence (HUMINT) assets in a theater of war and the 
potential to enable future military deception.91 
The CJSOTF prepares to infiltrate 10 three-man special reconnaissance 
teams consisting primarily of South Korean SOF. These teams will link up 
with intelligence assets in several provinces throughout the country via 
various insertion mediums. Each team has a list of targets: suspected 
locations of nuclear weapons, facilities, and ballistic missiles. They will 
report to the CJSOTF only during pre-planned communications windows, 
except in-extremis situations, using primarily satellite communications with 
high-frequency radio communications as an alternate. The CJSOTF plans 
to keep the teams in place throughout the entire operation, relying on the 
assistance of the intelligence assets to help hide and sustain them, and 
extract them only after the pre-emptive strike. 
The teams board small, unmarked planes, captured North Korean fishing 
junks, and allied submarines to begin their infiltration. They all meet a 
similar fate. One team conducts a high-altitude high-opening parachute 
jump into North Korea. They fly over 30 kilometers under canopy to their 
drop zone. As the operators land and begin to secure their equipment, 
spotlights blind them and machine gun and small arms fire blankets the drop 
zone. The operators take cover and attempt to report the contact to the 
CJSOTF and call for supporting fires. Their satellite radios are silent. The 
operators are killed or captured by the North Koreans within minutes before 
they can get their high-frequency radios into operation.  
Back in the operations center of the CJSOTF, the staff is getting nervous. 
Messages informing the CJSOTF that infiltration was successful should 
have come in by now. The commander and staff are beginning to fear 
something is wrong. After a few more minutes the messages start arriving, 
just a few pre-planned code words for each team informing the CJSOTF 
that infiltration is complete. 
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The undetected compromise of operational information resulted in the destruction 
of all of the reconnaissance teams in the scenario. While the scenario contemplates 
compromise before the infiltration of the teams, even if the compromise had occurred later 
in the mission the result would be the same. The DPRK would know where the teams were 
hiding, where they were going, and who was on them. They would simply have set 
ambushes elsewhere and then moved all of their nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to 
ensure that the follow-on strike would miss its targets. 
Something else happened in this scenario besides just the compromise of the 
CJSOTF’s classified networks. When ambushed, the reconnaissance team’s satellite 
communications did not work. Significant reliance on satellites for communications in 
North Korea is very realistic. The United States has no communications infrastructure 
above the 38th parallel, with the possible exception of ships off the coast or planes in the 
air to serve as relays for line-of-sight communications. Aircraft would probably be the only 
viable option for line-of-sight relay due to the rugged terrain, and no aircraft could fly 
above the 38th parallel in support of this reconnaissance mission due to the significant 
amount of anti-aircraft assets in North Korea and the political risk of flying any aircraft 
over North Korea in support of clandestine or covert operations.92 Perhaps the intelligence 
assets could have set up relays on mountaintops, but this would still be an unlikely and 
unreliable option. In our scenario, the failure of the satellite communications radios reflects 
the North Korean capability to jam the signals locally or even hack the satellites 
themselves.93 In this case, the DPRK planned the ambushes to be the first step in a larger 
strategic deception: eliminating the CJSOTF reconnaissance capability while having them 
think it was successful in executing its mission. This deception was made possible by the 
compromise of the classified network as well as the cyberspace operations conducted 
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against the satellites themselves, allowing the North Koreans to send the CJSOTF the exact 
messages they expect to receive.  
D. CONCLUSION 
While this scenario emphasized the clandestine infiltration of the CJSOTFs’ 
classified network, cyberspace operations could also be used to disrupt the same 
network.94 The scenario illustrated this when satellite communications were disrupted 
during the ambushes of the reconnaissance teams. How would a disruptive cyberspace 
operation against the DODIN differ from a non-disruptive one? A disruptive attack on the 
DODIN would have an immediate noticeable impact on the network, whereas detecting 
clandestine infiltration relies on finding anomalies that were designed to go unnoticed. The 
results of a disruptive cyberspace operation would be readily apparent as the network itself 
would have to be noticeably affected to achieve the desired battlefield effect.  
How would such attacks affect CJSOTF operations? The effects of these attacks are 
inherently temporary. Even assuming the disruptive attack renders a technological 
capability such as satellite communication permanently useless, maneuver units would 
quickly adapt and find a way to continue operations. Whether that adaptation would be 
switching to an alternate communications system, operating autonomously but guided by 
the intent of the commander in lieu of orders, or simply fixing or replacing the damaged 
system, deployed forces will continue the mission. The scenario illustrated this adaptive 
behavior during the ambush of the reconnaissance teams. The teams recognized the failure 
of satellite communications and attempted to employ high-frequency radios, but the DPRK 
forces killed or captured them before they could. 
Additional key differences between disruptive cyberspace operations and 
clandestine cyberspace operations are worthy of note. First, due to the temporary nature of 
disruption, timing and synchronization with terrestrial operations are critical. Yet it is also 
difficult. For disruptive cyberspace operations to be synchronized with terrestrial 
operations, the attacker would need to have successfully compromised a system—and 
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remain undetected until it was time to execute—with a sophisticated payload that could be 
executed either by remote control or at a programmed time. This is hard enough to 
accomplish against a relatively unprotected civilian system; the difficulty increases 
considerably when considering encrypted, air-gapped, or frequency-hopping military 
systems.  
Second, gaining entry into a system typically uses the same tools and methods, 
regardless of the purpose of the payload. The “cyber kill chain” highlights this point 
perfectly, as the exploits used to gain access could be the same despite one payload 
encrypting data while another payload establishes a reverse shell connection to an 
attacker.95 Additionally, upon the discovery of a cyberspace vulnerability, it is typically 
quickly patched, rendering that cyber weapon potentially useless against the target 
system.96 Therefore, conducting a disruptive cyberspace operation potentially wastes a 
valuable exploit that could have been used to gather operational information over an 
extended period of time. It will be up to the joint force commander to decide upon the more 
effective use of his arsenal of cyber weapons.  
Contrasting the differences between disruptive cyberspace operations and 
clandestine cyberspace operations highlights an important conclusion. Clandestine 
cyberspace operations that seek to infiltrate systems and gather operational information are 
likely to prove a more efficient use of offensive cyberspace operations on the battlefield. 
This is a function of both the difficulty of synchronizing disruptive cyberspace operations 
with terrestrial military operations, and the inherently short duration of their resulting 
effects.  Considering that software vulnerabilities are typically quickly patched once 
discovered, disruptive battlefield cyberspace operations should be considered carefully and 
used sparingly.  
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Electronic warfare or physical attacks on military communications networks would 
be a better means for achieving disruptive effects. These capabilities do not have limited 
uses like cyber weapons; they can be employed quickly, easily, and reliably time and again 
to disrupt enemy communications on the battlefield, and they are easier to synchronize with 
other physical military operations. Thus, a commander should not conduct disruptive 
cyberspace operations opportunistically, especially if a physical or electronic warfare 
alternative is available and could achieve the same effects. 
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IV. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT—PART II 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Part I of our thought experiment observed the potential impact of cyberspace-based 
operations on SOF conducting clandestine reconnaissance operations prior to open conflict 
on the Korean peninsula. It ended with the destruction of the reconnaissance forces as a 
result of undetected infiltration of U.S. classified computer networks and the beginning of 
a North Korean military deception. Part II envisions the impacts of cyberspace operations 
on the United States’ attempts to flow forces into the theater and engage in high-intensity 
combat. 
B. HOW DO BATTLEFIELD CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS IMPACT LAND 
FORCES? A KOREAN SCENARIO PART 2 
As a result of clandestinely stealing data from the CJSOTF classified 
computers, the North Koreans have a good idea of the coalition plan for a 
pre-emptive strike. They know the strike is planned to coincide with the 
annual exercises conducted between the United States and South Korea, but 
they do not know the exact date or all of the units that will enter the country 
for the operation.  
In an attempt to disrupt or delay the United States’ ability to flow forces 
into the theater, North Korean cyberspace operators attack the U.S. 
transportation system TC-AIMS II. They gain access by spear-phishing to 
compromise a user’s machine and install a remote-access tool. When the 
user logs into TC-AIMS II through the web-based interface, the attackers 
insert malware directly into the TC-AIMS II system. The malware 
specifically targets its databases with the intent of disrupting the 
deployment of U.S. forces to the Korean peninsula. The malware is scripted 
to execute at a set date and time. Two months before the start of the joint 
exercises, it activates a modified version of the infamous Shamoon malware 
and wipes thousands of hard drives and servers across the DODIN 
containing TC-AIMS II data, replacing it with Islamist propaganda.  
North Korea edited the malware to ensure success against a DOD target, 
considering the target operating system version and patches, leaving as 
many forensic clues as possible that point to Iran as the culprit. Considering 
the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen, the U.S. intelligence community 
has ample reason to suspect Iran for the hack, leaving the United States 
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unsuspecting of the compromise of the CJSOTF systems and North Korean 
knowledge of the impending coalition strike.  
The U.S. logistics system scrambles to recover, replacing hardware and re-
creating the databases and load plans from hard copies and backups. The 
cyberspace operation causes chaos for U.S. deployments globally, not just 
to Korea, which adds to the likelihood of misattribution to Iran. Flights and 
ships destined for the Korean peninsula are delayed by days, some even for 
weeks, as U.S. logisticians are forced to re-create plans and produce the 
required shipping forms and paperwork manually. As a result of this 
unforeseen disruption, the coalition commander decides to shift D-Day a 
week later than originally planned. 
Could a U.S. adversary conduct a cyberspace operation against critical logistics and 
transportation systems? While some critical deployment planning systems reside on the 
classified network, TC-AIMS II is a primary source for transportation management that 
operates on the unclassified network.97 It is an integrator system that takes deployment 
data and translates it into load plans for planes, ships, trucks, and trains. While the DODIN 
is a well-protected network, the unclassified NIPRNET still connects to the Internet and 
TC-AIMS II is accessible from a web-based portal page. Thus, attacks against systems or 
services on the NIPRNET are much more likely to be successful than attacks against the 
classified networks. Perhaps that is why the 2003 supportability strategy for the TC-AIMS 
II system identified cyberspace operations as among the most significant threats to the 
system.98  
If an adversary successfully damaged unit deployment systems and databases, how 
much would it impact the U.S. military’s ability to project force to the Korean peninsula? 
The Shamoon malware not only serves as a useful deception in our scenario but is also a 
prime example for gauging the amount of potential damage destructive malware could 
cause to U.S. logistics and transportation systems. Shamoon was designed to destroy stored 
data and corrupt the master boot record of infected machines, forcing hardware components 
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to be replaced to restore network operations.99 In 2012, Shamoon destroyed tens of 
thousands of hard drives and forced Saudi Aramco to shut down their network 
temporarily.100 In 2017, five years after the first appearance of the malware, a second 
variant of Shamoon destroyed computers and disabled networks of 15 Saudi Arabian 
government agencies.101  
Shamoon illustrates a recurring problem in cybersecurity, that despite patching 
known vulnerabilities, old malware continues to present a threat. There are numerous other 
examples of recycled malware to add to the Shamoon example. Other prominent examples 
of malware being reused years later include the Seasalt-Oceansalt malware used by APT 
1, which reappeared after a five-year hiatus, and the code for the Reaper Botnet, which was 
modified and used in the Mirai Botnet.102 This is representative of the cat and mouse game 
that is cyberspace operations. The attacker finds a vulnerability, develops an exploit, pairs 
it with a payload, and executes. The defenders then patch the vulnerability and use the 
signatures of the malware to improve detection. The attacker responds by finding a new 
vulnerability, developing a new exploit, modifying the old payload, and then executing 
again. The signatures used to detect the old malware are potentially useless even with only 
minor changes to the code, and due to the impossibly complex nature of modern software, 
vulnerabilities will almost certainly always exist.  
Our scenario envisions a similar limited duration disruption of computer and 
network-based resources that facilitate U.S. military forces transportation into the theater. 
The key to mitigating an attack like Shamoon is more than just crafting better means of 
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detecting old malware; it is the ability of an organization to recover from the attack and 
resume operations as quickly as possible.103 It took Saudi Aramco five months to recover 
from the 2012 attack.104 They were forced to make emergency purchases of replacement 
computer hardware and conduct business administration processes manually or by fax 
machine.105 Despite the slow recovery of Saudi Aramco’s information technology 
systems, their oil production was not affected. The systems that controlled operations were 
separate from the internal networks of the company.106 However, every unit in the U.S. 
Army uses TC-AIMS II for planning and executing unit movement operations.107 A 
Shamoon-like attack could be expected to slow or degrade operations temporarily until 
workarounds, such as manually created load plans, were established.  
If we assume the U.S. military could recover in half the time it took Saudi Aramco, 
then in our scenario the disruption to U.S. deployments could still last for months. We take 
into consideration, however, that the shock value of attacks like Shamoon has decreased 
since 2012, and we assume large organizations, especially the U.S. military, are more 
prepared to respond. As a result, in our scenario we calculate the impact of the disruption 
as delaying troop deployments for just one week, which could still be critically important.  
Reports begin to spread through the intelligence services of various governments 
regarding the disruption of the U.S. military’s logistics systems. Similar disruptive 
cyberspace operations are reported to be targeting major international air and 
maritime shipping hubs. The press is openly discussing the attacks against the U.S. 
military and global transportation systems, while the pundits begin to speculate on 
the culprit of such an attack.  
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North Korea uses the window they created to launch a pre-emptive strike against 
South Korea. North Korean SOF spent the weeks prior to D-Day penetrating South 
Korea through a series of pre-established entry points. At H-Hour, the designated 
time of the attack, North Korean SOF execute sabotage operations in a series of 
attacks against South Korean bridges, airports, and seaports, as well as strikes 
against key military leaders. The special operations in South Korea are intended to 
delay the military’s response to North Korean attacks along the DMZ and further 
delay efforts by the United States to flow forces into the Korean peninsula.  
Also at H-Hour, North Korea launches offensive cyberspace operations against 
civilian communications and military command and control targets. They conduct 
denial of service attacks against commercial and government web-based 
communications services within South Korea. They also launch a cyberspace 
operation against Seoul’s power grid in a move very reminiscent of the cyberspace 
operations that caused blackouts in Ivano-Frankivsk region of Ukraine in 2015.108 
Finally, North Korea disrupts allied military satellite communications services, 
specifically in the vicinity of command and control nodes along the DMZ. These 
operations are focused on disrupting the flow of information in Seoul and along the 
DMZ to prevent allied forces from mounting a quick response to the North Korean 
strike. The temporary loss of most means of communication results in the effective 
isolation of allied forces as artillery fire begins to fall. 
In conjunction with the SOF strikes and cyberspace operations, North Korea begins 
employing artillery fires from their hardened positions North of the DMZ. The 
artillery barrage is not intended to damage the city of Seoul, but to isolate it. 
Artillery targets include allied military command centers, headquarters, 
communications infrastructure, motor pools, and civilian infrastructure such as the 
roads and bridges linking Incheon International Airport with Seoul. The 
combination of cyberspace operations against satellite communications, Internet 
service providers and cellular service providers, as well as conventional artillery 
bombardment of allied command and control nodes, causes significant damage and 
ultimately delays a coordinated allied response to the attack.  
As the first artillery rounds begin to land south of the DMZ, two large North Korean 
assault echelons conduct a series of penetrations in order to break through South 
Korean defenses. An armored force attacks along the eastern coastal road to capture 
Sokcho and Gangneung. This attack is a feint designed to convince the allies that 
North Korea’s objective is to seize the entire peninsula. Battalion-sized feints are 
launched at locations all along the DMZ to add to the confusion of allied forces and 
fix defending forces in place. Concurrently, North Korean forces conduct a 
combined arms penetration across the DMZ north of Seoul. They execute a series 
                                                 




of highly choreographed breaches that penetrate allied lines and create avenues of 
approach for North Korean armored columns and mechanized forces. The fighting 
is brutal as both sides execute plans that have been trained and rehearsed for 
decades, yet the allies are at a temporary disadvantage. Air support is slow to arrive, 
delayed for hours due to disruptions in allied communications, and supporting fires 
from aircraft, ground, and naval assets are minimal and inaccurate as allied forces 
struggle to coordinate fire and maneuver. Speed is the critical factor, as North Korea 
has to take full advantage of the element of surprise and the degradation of U.S. 
and South Korean communications, command, and control.  
Once the North Korean forces break through the DMZ, their mechanized forces 
leverage the South’s well-developed road system to lead a drive on Seoul. With the 
preponderance of military forces arrayed along the DMZ, no military forces of 
significant size to halt the North Korean advance are stationed within the city and 
police forces cannot hope to stop the attack. Enemy tanks and armored vehicles 
push civilian traffic off the road as they sprint to seize objectives in the city center 
and throughout heavily populated sectors of the city. Infantry forces establish 
checkpoints at key intersections in an effort to stem the flow of people fleeing the 
city and increase the deterrent to an allied counterattack. Within 12 hours of the 
operation’s beginning, North Korean forces seize key portions of northern Seoul.  
During the first hour of the attack, the North Koreans leverage their Chinese and 
Russian partners to conduct an international diplomatic offensive. They provide 
stolen plans and communications that detail the allied reconnaissance into North 
Korea and the planned allied strike to media outlets worldwide. Kim Jong Un, with 
Russian and Chinese support, appeals to the international community to condemn 
illegal U.S. actions and portrays his highly restrained response as necessary for the 
defense of North Korea. Once Seoul is surrounded and partially occupied, he calls 
for a ceasefire and the establishment of an international commission to arbitrate the 
end of the war. Kim Jong Un wants full international recognition of North Korea as 
a sovereign nation, recognition of the legitimacy of his nuclear program, and lifting 
of economic sanctions. His bargaining chip is Seoul. He offers to return all occupied 
territories to South Korea in exchange for his demands. He highlights North Korean 
restraint, specifically their non-use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction during the offensive, as well as their relatively retrained approach to 
Seoul. Kim pledges North Korea will maintain such civilized restraint as long as 
the United States and South Korea refrain from invading the North. 
Fighting continues over the next 24 hours while North Korea pushes more forces 
into parts of the city. By H+36, approximately 150,000 North Korean troops 
surround or occupy portions of Seoul. DPRK troops establish defensive positions 
in and around Seoul ranging from the city center north to the outer edges of the vast 
urban sprawl. Borrowing from Egyptian strategy in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 
North Korea’s military shifts to a strategic defensive underneath an air-defense and 
anti-ship missile umbrella, establishing strongpoints in Seoul, SokCho, and 
Gangneung. 
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Could North Korea successfully conduct offensive cyberspace operations against 
Internet and cellular service, U.S. satellite communications, or the Seoul power grid? North 
Korea has already demonstrated its intent, if not yet the capability to target South Korean 
energy infrastructure. In December 2014, North Korea launched an unsuccessful 
cyberattack against Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power designed to steal data and damage 
computers.109 A year prior, North Korean cyberspace operators conducted damaging 
attacks against banks and public media companies employing malware that wipes master 
boot records, a tactic similar to that used against Saudi Aramco. Also in 2013, North 
Korean hackers conducted denial of service attacks against government and media websites 
as well as domain name servers.110 Therefore, we assess that North Korea does have the 
capability to conduct offensive cyberspace operations against civilian websites, companies, 
and infrastructure. The effects envisioned in our scenario are at least possible, though 
perhaps unlikely to be synchronized so precisely with ground operations for now. 
As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, we also assume that North Korea does 
have the ability to disrupt U.S. satellite communications in the region. The most likely 
means of disrupting satellite communications would probably be electromagnetic jamming 
rather than cyberspace operations. However, cyberspace operations can achieve similar 
effects. At the Black Hat 2018 cybersecurity conference, security researcher Ruben 
Santamarta gave a presentation on satellite hacking where he claimed he could control 
antenna position and power usage on military and maritime satellites.111 Such control could 
enable a hacker to produce disruptive effects similar to those envisioned in our scenario. 
If the cyberspace operations envisioned in our scenario were successful, how would 
they affect allied forces? North Korean offensive cyberspace operations against Internet 
and cellular service providers would seek to disrupt civilian communications within Seoul. 
The purpose would be similar to that which was evident in the Russian invasion of Georgia. 
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Coordinated cyberspace operations disrupted government and civilian communications 
throughout the country in a two-pronged effort to slow internal responses and confuse 
international opinion. A combination of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) 
against Internet service providers (ISP) and Domain Name System (DNS) service 
providers, as well as electromagnetic jamming of cellular towers in Seoul, could likely 
achieve the communication disruption envisioned in our scenario. When coupled with 
potential blackouts as a result of attacks on the power grid, public communication in Seoul 
could be disrupted for hours, resulting in confusing, inaccurate, or late reporting on events 
occurring in Seoul.  
The cyberspace operations against allied satellite communications would produce 
a denial-of-service effect, whether through downlink or uplink jamming or control of the 
antenna. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military relied heavily on commercial 
satellite communications and experienced numerous cases of degraded or terminated 
satellite communications between July 2004 and November 2005. Twenty-one of those 
cases were considered as potentially due to jamming from a hostile actor with an average 
duration of 85 hours per event. In 2011, North Korea jammed GPS signals in South Korea 
along the DMZ for 10 days while the U.S. and South Korea were conducting annual 
military exercises.  
Our scenario incorporates cyberspace operations against allied satellite 
communications as one piece of a coordinated assault on allied command, control, and 
communications. More importantly, the cyberwar assault is synchronized with the 
terrestrial military force required to take advantage of the fleeting opportunity provided by 
disrupting allied communications. As noted in the previous chapter, military forces will 
eventually adapt and overcome disruption. The effects will be temporary even if they last 
for hours or days. Therefore, precise synchronization with physical maneuver forces is 
critical to the successful use of disruptive cyberspace operations to achieve battlefield 
objectives. 
The coalition quickly realizes the limited nature of Pyongyang’s attack. Coupled 
with the high-visibility diplomatic pressure, U.S. and South Korean responses are 
restrained. The allies maintain control of the major ports and airfields in South 
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Korea and U.S. transportation systems have recovered from North Korean 
cyberspace operations as a result of the work of JFHQ-DODIN and cyber protection 
teams identifying, isolating, and removing the malware from U.S. systems. U.S. 
ground forces begin to flow into the country unchallenged. With North Korean 
ground forces dug into defensive positions in and around Seoul, Sokcho, and 
Gangneung, allied ground forces prepare for tough urban combat. 
The recapture of Gangneung and Sokcho takes two weeks. The U.S. and South 
Korean forces liberate the cities, though allied and civilian casualties are 
uncomfortably high. The fighting in these two cities gives only a glimpse of the 
difficulty to come in freeing Seoul. 
Allied armored brigades strike to the north of Seoul first, cutting off lines of 
communication to North Korea while air and sea power deliver punishing fires to 
air defense and artillery targets supporting the forces in Seoul. USCYBERCOM 
and JFHQ-DODIN have deployed additional cyber defense teams to support U.S. 
Forces Korea, and within two weeks, they have identified and corrected the 
intrusions in the CJSOTF systems and U.S. satellites. As the U.S. high-tech war 
machine is finally operating at full capacity, prospects look dim for the North 
Koreans.  
Kim’s gamble is that the price to dig North Korean forces out of Seoul street by 
street is too high for the United States and South Koreans to pay. The allies call his 
bluff, betting that he will not escalate to nuclear use in extremis. Once Seoul is 
isolated from resupply and supporting fires, mechanized and light infantry, 
supported by dispersed armor companies and attack aviation, begin the herculean 
effort to clear the city methodically. Prior to the assault to assist in developing 
greater situational awareness within the city, cyberspace operations map the 
computer networks in the city, establish communications and reporting channels 
with trapped residents, and gain access to Internet-connected sensors and civilian 
infrastructure.  
The coalition operations center monitoring the cyberspace operations is soon 
receiving reports of unit compositions and dispositions throughout the city, 
complete with pictures taken by a smartphone and uploaded to their reporting 
websites. Weather, traffic, and security cameras throughout the city provide live 
feeds of key intersections and locations. Enemy positions are populated on the 
common operating picture shared by all allied ground units and live video feeds are 
accessible via smartphone. Coalition forces leverage this information superiority to 
great effect, avoiding multiple ambushes and surprising their North Korean 
adversaries repeatedly. However, knowledge of the battlefield is never perfect, or 
even complete, and the fighting is hard. Coalition and civilian casualties are high, 
but the city is eventually retaken. 
Could U.S. tactical forces conduct cyberspace operations in support of combat in a 
dense urban environment? Most of the cyberspace operations described in our scenario are 
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far simpler than some of the highly sophisticated operations the U.S. government is 
believed to have executed.112 Many Internet-connected devices are vulnerable as most 
arrive with default passwords that many users do not change.113 Hacking closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) feeds might be more challenging. However, a software vulnerability 
discovered recently was estimated to have put over 100,000 CCTV camera installations 
worldwide at risk of compromise.114  
The U.S. military undoubtedly has the skilled personnel within USCYBERCOM 
and the service cyber commands to conduct these types of operations, but tactical 
formations such as the brigade combat team do not have organic cyber assets.115 
USCYBERCOM announced in May 2018 that the Cyber Mission Force had reached full 
operational capability.116 The Cyber Mission Force consists of national mission teams, 
which support national objectives in cyberspace, and combat mission teams, which support 
geographic combatant commander objectives in cyberspace.117 Additionally, U.S. Army 
cyber command has three Expeditionary Cyber Support Detachments designed to embed 
with tactical units.118  
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Conflict in Korea would be a main effort for the DOD, and at the very least, we 
would assume that multiple combat mission teams, and perhaps a national mission team as 
well, would be made available to the commander of U.S. Forces Korea. We also assume 
that U.S. Army Cyber Command would provide expeditionary cyber support detachments. 
In our scenario, we envision the U.S. Forces Korea Commander employing cyber assets in 
support of ground combat in Seoul, providing redundant cyberspace operations capability 
from at least the brigade level to up to U.S. Forces Korea. 
How would cyberspace operations affect combat in large, dense cities? The U.S. 
Army has spent a considerable amount of time thinking about the megacity problem, under 
the assumption that fighting in megacities will be unavoidable in future conflicts.119 The 
vast majority of responses to a survey conducted by the Army’s Mad Scientist Initiative 
calling for ideas to help address the problem of fighting in a megacity revolved around how 
to increase situational awareness in the megacity environment.120 Many of these ideas 
captured opportunities provided by cyberspace as a result of the growing Internet of Things 
and ubiquitous connectivity offered in highly developed megacities.  
Every megacity should be analyzed and considered separately.121 In the specific 
context of Seoul, cyberspace opportunities for increasing situational awareness seem very 
plausible. South Korea, and especially its capital, is a nation and a culture that embraces high 
technology. Seoul is a city with developed infrastructure, stable governance, and a tech-savvy 
population. The city is teeming with wireless networks and Internet-connected devices and 
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sensors.122 In our scenario, cyberspace operations are used to gain access to these flows of 
information provided by sensors throughout the city such as CCTV networks, traffic 
cameras, and weather cameras.  
The heightened situational awareness for allied forces is in stark contrast with the 
lack of situational awareness for North Korean forces, due to the assumed lack of 
technological familiarity among average North Korean troops. While North Korea boasts an 
impressive cyberspace operations capability, based on their penchant for strategic use we 
assume this capability would not be integrated with tactical forces.123 Additionally, North 
Korea is a nation where access to the Internet is highly controlled.124 We therefore assume 
that average North Korean troops will be unfamiliar with the Internet in general, and 
specifically smart devices and the Internet of things.  
Also crucial to the specific analysis of Seoul is the attitude of the population toward 
the military forces operating within the city. One of the most significant reasons the U.S. 
Army fears megacity combat is the assumption of an unsupportive population.125 However, 
in our scenario, the South Korean people would welcome allied forces as liberators after 
being occupied by North Korean forces. They would likely seek to assist them where possible 
and perhaps even organize organic resistance against the North Korean occupiers. It is this 
envisioned popular support within Seoul that part of our cyberspace operations taps into, by 
establishing means through cyberspace for individuals in Seoul to communicate tactically 
relevant information to allied military forces. This unique characteristic of combat in Seoul 
makes the situation far different from recent historical parallels of urban fighting in Baghdad, 
Fallujah, or Grozny. While the dense urban terrain and aversion to collateral damage would 
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limit the use of U.S. and South Korean long-range precision fires, the supportive civilian 
population, high-tech infrastructure, and widespread Internet connectivity would create 
opportunities for improving situational awareness and provide networked communication 
through cyberspace operations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Part II of our thought experiment saw cyberspace operations used by North Korea to 
create temporary disruption of allied communications, command, and control capabilities. 
Allied forces, on the other hand, used cyberspace operations in a technologically advanced, 
dense urban environment to enhance their situational awareness waging what Martin Libicki 
has called “intelligence-based warfare.” In line with our cyber domain interaction 
framework, both belligerents used cyberspace operations to attack two specific technological 
capabilities tied to the cyber domain: global communications networks and sensor networks. 
By attacking these capabilities, they manipulated the effects those capabilities manifest on 
the battlefield: instant global communications were disrupted for hours in conjunction with 
a multi-pronged combined arms assault, and situational awareness for ground forces in Seoul 
was enhanced by tapping into Internet-connected video feeds. 
What emerges from an analysis of North Korean cyberspace operations to disrupt 
allied communications is that synchronization of cyber operations with the ground assault is 
a necessary condition for success. Many experts have discussed the need for and difficulty 
of synchronizing cyberspace operations with terrestrial operations for them to have any 
meaningful battlefield effect. A recent study aimed to demonstrate the battlefield impact of 
cyberspace operations concluded that cyberspace operations have no observable effect on 
battlefield actions. However, the authors note in these instances the lack of coordination 
between cyberspace operations and ground operations, likening it to the often poor 
coordination between air power and ground forces in World War I. Additionally, the authors 
excluded the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the best-known case of synchronized physical 
and cyberspace operations, from their study.  
Our thought experiment highlights the critical role synchronization plays when using 
cyberspace operations to create disruptive battlefield effects. In this scenario, North Korean 
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deception after discovering allied plans for a pre-emptive strike enabled a surprise attack on 
South Korea. However, the ironically named DMZ is perhaps the most heavily armed place 
on the planet. The United States and South Korea have considerable military assets stationed 
there, but quantitatively their forces are dwarfed by those of North Korea. The allies make 
up for lack of numbers with higher-quality and cutting-edge technology, including the ability 
to bring overwhelming fire swiftly to bear on any North Korean assault. By disrupting allied 
communications, the DPRK disabled the United States’ and South Korea’s ability to direct 
ground maneuver or leverage their long-range precision fires quickly enough to prevent 
North Korea’s seizure of parts of Seoul; but that disruption would likely have been 
ineffective if it were an hour too early or an hour too late.  
An analysis of allied cyberspace operations to enhance situational awareness within 
Seoul highlights the contrast between conducting cyberspace operations against civilian 
systems connected to the Internet and military systems that may or may not be connected to 
the Internet: civilian systems connected to the Internet are significantly easier to breach. It 
also highlights the importance terrain may play regarding the opportunities that might be 
available through cyberspace. While the terrain of Seoul limits the value of standard military 
airborne and satellite surveillance or reconnaissance assets, the highly developed and high-
tech nature of the city provides numerous cyberspace opportunities to enhance situational 
awareness that would be unavailable elsewhere.  
This idea may seem counterintuitive. While it is true that cyberspace may be 
accessible from anywhere with the proper technology, physical terrain still does matter, 
especially in the context of planning a military campaign. The connectivity of the physical 
terrain within which military operations will be conducted is important in determining what 
potential cyberspace operations are available to support a course of action. Perhaps more 
importantly, physical terrain may sometimes constitute key terrain for cyberspace operations. 
Such key terrain might be Internet exchange points, physical routers or servers, cellular 
towers, power plants, electrical substations, undersea cables, or other targets. As was 
demonstrated by the Operation Desert Storm air campaign’s targeting of Iraqi command and 
control capabilities, affecting physical targets that represent key terrain in cyberspace is often 
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easier in the physical domains than through cyberspace.126  Physical attacks, as opposed to 
cyberspace operations, to create disruptive battlespace effects are also more easily 
synchronized with terrestrial military operations, as conventional military forces and 
weapons would accomplish the attack.  
Our two-part thought experiment has attempted to envision a diverse set of 
cyberspace operations deliberately aimed at creating battlefield effects, with the intent of 
exploring the feasibility of such actions as well as their impacts on maneuver warfare. In the 
next section, we evaluate the insights provided by the thought experiments and analyze their 
implications for modern warfare. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, we have attempted to envision how cyber operations may affect the 
modern battlefield in order to identify what the cyber domain implies for land warfare. We 
noted that the bulk of the conversation that has taken place over the past few decades has 
primarily focused on the strategic implications of this new domain, rather than what it 
implies for ground forces in combat. Given the lack of available historical case studies to 
analyze, we conducted a two-part thought experiment to visualize cyberspace operations 
conducted as part of a possible future military conflict on the Korean peninsula. 
We created a theoretical framework for envisioning the interaction between the 
cyber domain and the physical domains. Our framework identified four primary 
technological capabilities that rely on cyberspace to create multiple battlefield effects for 
modern militaries. Those four capabilities are global communication networks; sensor 
networks; data processing, storage and analytics; and artificial intelligence. The effects 
these capabilities enable on the battlefield include, but are not necessarily limited to, long-
range precision fires, empowered small units, enhanced situational awareness, fast global 
command, control, and communications, and improved decision-making. Finally, our 
framework notes that cyberspace operations can manipulate these effects by either 
attacking, defending, or sustaining the technological capabilities above. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
From our thought experiment, we deduced three important findings regarding the 
use of cyberspace operations on the battlefield. Of note, our findings do not encompass the 
strategic use of cyber. As we stressed in Chapter I, much analysis has been done regarding 
the strategic implications of cyberspace operations and the goal of our work is to help turn 
the debate instead toward its battlefield implications. First, offensive cyberspace operations 
can broadly be used either to disrupt battlefield systems or to conduct ISR.  Both types of 
operations, if successful, would have significant impacts on battle. Second, 
synchronization with ground force operations is perhaps the most critical requirement for 
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disruptive cyberspace operations to have any meaningful battlefield effect. Third, despite 
the global reach of cyberspace, terrain and enemy still matter regarding what is possible 
through this new domain.  
As is reflected by our theoretical framework, we began this investigation into 
cyberspace and modern warfare anticipating that battlefield utility would revolve around 
disruption of technological capabilities. This idea grew out of the ever-increasing 
connectivity of modern militaries and weapon systems, and the insights of Thomas Rona 
and others regarding the vulnerabilities of advanced weapons systems. The most surprising 
insight gained through the thought experiment is that while there are certainly significant 
opportunities to disrupt battlefield systems through cyberspace operations, using 
cyberspace operations to conduct ISR could have similarly significant effects on land 
warfare.  
As was represented in our thought experiments, conducting cyber ISR during a 
conflict could give a belligerent an enduring advantage if cyber infiltrations are and remain 
undiscovered. Foreknowledge of what your enemy will do, when, where, and how they 
will do it is akin to knowing the future, as was the case with ULTRA in World War II. 
Having such knowledge almost guarantees achieving surprise on the battlefield or 
outmaneuvering an opponent. Cyberspace operations that steal data often last months or 
even years before they are discovered and remediated like ULTRA. Thus, the value gained 
from one successful offensive cyberspace operation would be multiplied by the battlefield 
effects achieved over time as a result of having an information advantage.  
Contrast the long duration value of gathering operational information with the 
relatively short duration use of cyber-weapons to disrupt a technological capability on the 
battlefield. As noted in Chapter III, disruption by its very nature is immediately apparent. 
While some amount of time may be necessary to identify the cause of the disruption and 
develop and implement a solution, the immediate battlefield impact of disruption will likely 
be measured in minutes, hours, or days. While this disruption could prove decisive in battle, 
military organizations are trained to adapt to contingencies. Therefore, no matter how 
dependent on any piece of technology, a military organization in combat should quickly 
adapt to disruption and either fix the problem or operate without the technology. 
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Nevertheless, even short-term battlefield disruptions can have profound effects on the 
outcome of a campaign or war.  
This finding could be important if a commander has only a limited amount of cyber-
weapons.  Cyber-weapons are more difficult to employ than traditional munitions. While 
code can simply be replicated and transported across cyberspace at light speed, cyber-
weapons must take advantage of vulnerabilities, whether in hardware, software, or humans, 
to gain access to their target.127  
Vulnerabilities must first be discovered, and then an exploit that takes advantage of 
the vulnerability developed, in order for a cyber-weapon to gain access to a target.  While 
Axelrod and Iliev argue convincingly that there is no shortage of vulnerabilities due to the 
regular influx of new and updated software coupled with the growing market for exploits, 
software development and vulnerability patching is a constantly moving target.128  New 
versions of common software, such as operating systems, are typically released every few 
years.  Patches for those programs are released much more often, typically weeks or months 
elapse between patches, and at irregular times based on the severity of the bug or 
vulnerability being patched.129  Security researchers and exploit developers are often racing 
against the clock and each other to find, fix, or exploit vulnerabilities.  Clark demonstrated 
that new software experiences a “honeymoon effect” when it is first released as old tools 
and exploits are ineffective and attackers are unfamiliar with the code.130   
Disruptive battlefield cyberspace operations might seem more difficult or less 
likely, but that assumption might not be correct. We recognize that in conducting only 
open-source research, our assumptions regarding the difficulty and likelihood of disruptive 
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cyberspace operations against military targets may be overstated. We do not know the 
extent to which classified capabilities can infiltrate air-gapped networks, disable radar or 
other hardened sensor systems, or even attack advanced weapon systems themselves such 
as ballistic missile launchers, tanks, or aircraft. A recent report released by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) concludes that advanced U.S. weapons systems in 
development are rife with cyber vulnerabilities, which indicates that perhaps disruptive 
attacks against military systems might be easier and more likely than we imagined in our 
thought experiment.131  
With regard to disruptive operations, our thought experiment highlighted the 
critical role synchronization plays in exploiting the windows of opportunity such disruption 
creates. If disruption only lasts minutes, hours, or days, then physical battlefield maneuver 
must be precisely timed and executed within that window.  
Such precise synchronization between cyberspace and terrestrial operations is 
inherently challenging, as noted in JP 3-12(R).132 Accomplishing the required level of 
synchronization might require direct command and control of the payload to be employed 
while also knowing exactly how long it would take to achieve its effects on the target 
system. Direct command and control are often impossible if the target system is air-gapped. 
Synchronization may also be achieved through programming a specific date and time for 
execution of the payload, yet this option could be foiled if the system attacked had incorrect 
time settings or if the ground forces were unable to achieve the required maneuver at the 
designated time. Finally, if the payload is incorrectly designed or inadequately tested, it 
may not function properly, fail to achieve the desired disruptive effects, or cause 
unintended effects that spread beyond the intended target. These are just a few simple 
examples, but they seem to align with Libicki’s observations on the challenges of 
synchronization.133 
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Our final finding is that enemy and terrain matter with regard to what battlefield 
effects are possible through cyberspace. The cyberspace operations conducted by allied 
forces to enhance situational awareness in Seoul would not be applicable to a tank battle in 
the desert or SOF teams hunting insurgents in dense jungle. Disrupting satellite 
communications would be ineffective against an enemy that does not use satellites to 
communicate. Cyberspace operations require cyberspace along with an enemy or 
surrounding terrain using machines connected to it. Yet the world is becoming more and 
more connected; almost every human being on the planet has a cell phone. Cyberspace 
operations will undoubtedly be considered in all future combat, but what those operations 
can accomplish on the battlefield will be a direct reflection of the enemy and the terrain. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
What do cyberspace operations imply for land warfare? We have three suggestions. 
First, synchronization should be added to the ever-growing list of principles of warfare. 
The version of the principles of war elucidated by the Baron Jomini two centuries ago have 
been a feature of U.S. Army doctrine ever since. These principles have changed little over 
time; however, current joint doctrine not only renames them the “Principles of Joint 
Operations,” but also includes a handful of new additions to account for military operations 
across the spectrum of conflict.134 While our thought experiment does not provide 
compelling reasons in itself to narrow down the existing list, it does suggest the possible 
addition of a new principle: synchronization. 
The current, largely Jominian, principles are mass, objective, offensive, security, 
economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, simplicity, surprise, legitimacy, 
perseverance, and restraint. None of these principles communicate or imply the need for 
synchronization on the modern battlefield except mass, which we will address shortly. The 
importance of synchronization in modern warfare predates the recognition of cyberspace 
as a warfighting domain; it was noted as a significant factor in the United States’ success 
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during Operation Desert Storm.135 The need for, and critical importance of, 
synchronization in modern warfare is a direct result of the increased speed at which 
information, forces, and weapons effects traverse the battlefield. The information 
technologies that underpin cyberspace, as well as all of the capabilities and effects included 
in our theoretical framework, create major advantages that can only be realized with precise 
synchronization. 
The need for synchronization is reflected in the current joint definition of the 
principle of mass. It has evolved from one of massed forces at the decisive point to massed 
effects on the battlefield at the right time and place.136 This definition not only implies a 
requirement for synchronization but also provides an argument for replacing mass 
altogether. The massing of effects by dispersed and disparate forces is contradictory to the 
actual definition of the word “mass” as a large body of matter. Is victory on the modern 
battlefield achieved by massing effects at a specific time and place or by precisely 
choreographing the actions of dispersed forces to achieve a given objective? Special Forces 
teams synchronized U.S. air power with Northern Alliance ground forces to topple the 
Taliban in two months in 2001.  The synchronization of a coalition joint invasion force 
toppled the Iraqi government in less than a month in 2003. Boot describes The New 
American Way of War as, “speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise…integrate[ing] naval, 
air, and land power into a seamless whole.”137 Perhaps it is time to abandon the fiction that 
mass is still a principle of warfare; effects cannot be massed at a place and time without 
precise synchronization. 
Our second suggestion is that a critical element of cyberspace superiority is the 
ability to quickly recover from attacks on cyberspace capabilities. The idea of cyberspace 
superiority is not novel. The term is established in JP 3-12(R) and defined as “the degree 
of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of 
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operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time 
and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.”138 However, our thought 
experiment only began to highlight the significant level of dependence that modern armies 
have on cyberspace. The GAO report referenced earlier notes that virtually every advanced 
weapon system is connected to cyberspace.139 Additionally, the requirement for 
synchronization depends on fast global connectivity; in other words, cyberspace. Many 
high-technology military capabilities are dependent on space assets, the operation of which 
depend on cyberspace.140 For an advanced military like that of the United States’ to 
function properly, it must have cyberspace superiority. 
Is superiority in cyberspace even achievable against a peer competitor? As opposed 
to air or sea superiority, where physical territory can be protected from enemy threats by 
destroying them as they enter; cyberspace superiority cannot be protected in such a way.  
Superiority in cyberspace will likely require both the ability to prevent most attacks on the 
DODIN but also to quickly recover from attacks that are successful.  Physical territory will 
still require physical protection in the other domains, yet even if the joint force is 
completely successful in protecting the physical infrastructure and the logical network of 
the DODIN, cyberspace capabilities could still be disrupted through electromagnetic 
jamming either over broad areas or in precise locations at significant distances. Thus, the 
ability to quickly adapt to and recover from the compromise, loss, or disruption of a 
cyberspace capability will be critical to regaining and maintaining cyberspace superiority. 
The ability to recover from attacks on cyberspace capabilities covers the entire 
spectrum of resilience and redundancy to include creating and maintaining data and system 
backups, having replacement hardware on hand, equipping the force with redundant 
capabilities, and training the force to react to technological capabilities being disrupted.  
While the military undoubtedly does all of these things to some extent, codifying the ability 
to recover as a requirement for achieving and maintaining cyberspace superiority will put 
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added emphasis on the importance of these tasks and the responsibility for implementing 
them will be viewed as an operational imperative by the Commander; rather than only a 
key task of the communications section of the staff.  
Finally, cyberspace operations need to be considered as a central part of joint 
operational planning and execution. The DOD has made many of the organizational 
changes necessary to implement this with the establishment of USCYBERCOM as a 
unified combatant command and the U.S. Army’s establishment of the cyber branch as a 
combat arms branch instead of a support branch.141 However, changes still need to be 
implemented at the individual and unit level. Operations staffs across the joint force need 
to understand what cyberspace operations can do and how to integrate them into their larger 
campaign plan. This requires nurturing individual training and education among the other 
operations branches as well as growing more cyberspace experts to serve in operational 
staffs. The U.S. Army is currently working toward building an organic cyber capability 
into the Brigade Combat Team, and the geographic combatant commands each have 
aligned cyber mission force teams.142 These steps are a good start and over time will help 
build understanding regarding the integration of cyberspace operations with joint 
operations. 
Perhaps this also implies that mission planning, especially mission analysis, needs 
to adapt. Commanders and staffs plan operations when looking at a map. During mission 
analysis, the map is populated with overlays and graphics that depict different features of 
the terrain, enemy, and population to give the operational staff a framework on which to 
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build their friendly plan. Because cyberspace cannot be depicted on a traditional map, it is 
often considered as an afterthought or only a “form of fires” during mission planning. An 
operational staff will likely view defensive cyberspace operations as a supporting 
function—simply keeping the communications up and running—while offensive 
cyberspace operations are likely to be viewed as a form of supporting fires, disabling 
targets on the physical battlefield.  
For cyberspace operations to be understood as a subordinate maneuver capability 
for the commander, the operations staff needs a visual framework on which to overlay 
maneuver plans. What should this visual framework look like? Should it be friendly and 
enemy network maps? Should it be map symbols that indicate potential cyberspace 
vulnerabilities of specific units or location? Designing a visual framework for planning 
cyberspace operations that can be set right next to a map of the area of operations would 
be an interesting follow-up to our research and a step in the right direction in terms of 
successfully integrating cyberspace operations with military operations in the other 
domains.  
D. A WAY AHEAD: ORGANIZATIONAL PARALLELS TO HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
We identified several parallels that cyberspace operations share with 
unconventional warfare and HUMINT operations, especially considering the distinction 
between Title 10 and Title 50 authorities.143 These similarities might provide a useful 
model for assisting operational staffs and commanders in their understanding of cyber as 
well as organizing those staff sections to better support cyberspace operations. The 
military’s grasp of HUMINT ebbs and flows from commander to commander and we 
foresee a similar trend developing with cyber. This occurs to the detriment of the capability 
as it is either underutilized or used incorrectly. Optimizing HUMINT employment requires 
a commander who understands, and is comfortable with, the tool; we believe the same is 
true for cyberspace operations. 
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Cyberspace operations, like unconventional warfare and HUMINT, require a 
significant amount of support, long-term planning, and advanced skills. A significant 
portion of planning for both activities occurs before conflict arises. Military activities prior 
to a declaration of armed conflict create ambiguity for the application of the means. The 
often vague delineation of responsibilities between the intelligence and operations sections 
of a military staff for the employment of HUMINT illustrates the dualistic nature of those 
activities. Similar confusion could arise when assessing employment of cyberspace 
operations. 
The management of cyberspace operations is most effectively controlled by the 
operations section, but those operations will at times support information collection 
requirements from the intelligence section of the staff. The use of HUMINT and 
unconventional warfare operations as a model for the planning and the management of 
cyberspace operations by a Joint Staff could help integrate cyberspace operations and 
terrestrial operations on future battlefields.  
E. MERGING BITS WITH BULLETS 
Cyberspace is too vital to the proper function of modern militaries for operations 
within it to be regarded as a support function. In an increasingly interconnected world 
where every new piece of technology is networked, cyberspace presents countless 
opportunities—and vulnerabilities—to manifest significant battlefield effects. Thus, either 
offense or defense can be enhanced or undermined by cyberspace operations. While we 
broadly classified offensive cyberspace operations as either disruptive or information 
gathering, when properly integrated into the joint operational plan both can achieve 
outsized battlefield effects.  
To integrate cyberspace operations with joint force operations in the other domains 
successfully, cyberspace operations need to be understood in terms of the effects they can 
create on the battlefield. One way to envision these effects is through our proposed cyber-
domain interaction framework. Additionally, commanders not only need cyberspace 
experts as an organic part of their operations and intelligence staff but also a general 
conceptual understanding of cyberspace operations is needed for all operations officers. 
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Otherwise, cyberspace operations risk being considered as an afterthought or a supporting 
function during mission planning rather than as a subordinate maneuver element. 
How U.S. military staffs organize for and manage HUMINT operations might be 
a good model for integrating cyberspace operations as well. The parallels in the need for 
long-term preparation and highly skilled and specialized individuals indicate there might 
be benefit in organizing cyberspace operations sections of a joint staff in line with this 
model.  Specifically, creating cyberspace activities subsections as part of both the 
operations and intelligence sections of the staff to facilitate operational planning and 
synchronization while also leveraging intelligence assets and fulfilling intelligence 
requirements. 
While we are not challenging the utility or necessity of strategic cyberspace 
operations, we hope that our study brings attention to, and stimulates the discussion of, 
what cyberspace operations can mean for land warfare. As long as the discussion continues 
to focus on the strategic level of war, the U.S. military will continue to struggle to realize 
the implications that cyberspace has for the battlefield. It will also continue to struggle to 
integrate cyberspace operations with joint force operations in the other domains. We hope 
our research has provided a useful contribution to the conversation and a renewed focus on 
what cyberspace operations mean for combat rather than just what they mean for broader 
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